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Mental capacity and autonomy are often understood to be normatively neutral – the only 
values or other norms they may presuppose are those the assessed person does or would 
accept. We show how mental disorder threatens normatively neutral accounts of autonomy. 
These accounts produce false positives, particularly in case of disorders (such as depression, 
anorexia nervosa, and schizophrenia) that affect evaluative abilities. Two normatively neutral 
strategies for handling autonomy-undermining disorder are explored and rejected: a blanket 
exclusion of mental disorder and functional tests requiring consistency, expression of identity, 
reflective non-alienation, or lack of compulsion. Finally, we suggest ways in which 
substantivist alternatives to neutrality can be made more promising through increased 
transparency, democratic contestability of conditions for capacity and autonomy, and a 
historically sensitive caution concerning restrictions of liberty. 
Introduction 
The concept of mental capacity continues to influence health and social care practice in many 
liberal states, and dedicated mental capacity legislation is increasingly common.
1
 When 
                                                 
1
 Examples include Scotland‘s Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 and England and Wales‘ Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, as well as narrower guardianship-based legislation centred on mental capacity, such as 
Ontario‘s Substitute Decision Act 1992 and South Australia‘s The Guardianship and Administration Act 1993. 
The Northern Ireland Executive has proposed to introduce a comprehensive mental capacity bill, and similar 
legislation is under review in the Republic of Ireland. 
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someone is found to lack capacity to make a decision, then, in certain circumstances, others 
are legally permitted to decide on their behalf. This typically includes powers to direct 
medical treatment, financial affairs, and living arrangements, amongst other matters. Indeed, 
‗the right to autonomy‘ has even been said to be a person‘s ‗full legal capacity to make 
decisions for themselves‘ (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2007:15). Thus, how mental 
capacity is understood and assessed can be critically important. 
Mental capacity and autonomy have contested conditions – each admitting of 
numerous interpretations – with many accounts aspiring to a form of normative neutrality, 
thought to befit liberalism. Such neutrality requires states to accommodate pluralism about 
fundamental ethical, philosophical and religious matters amongst reasonable citizens (i.e. 
those who themselves respect such pluralism).
2
 Justifications for maintaining neutrality about 
the good life include claims that this stance is entailed by the moral equality of citizens 
(Dworkin 1990) and is needed for the legitimation of any coercive political power (Rawls 
1996). When extended to mental capacity, normative neutrality suggests that eccentric, 
unpopular or unwise decision-making should not imply a lack of legal capacity to decide. 
Normative neutrality concerning decision-making competence has found considerable 
legal support. For instance, in English common law, irrationality has been deemed no barrier 
to competence, even when a decision is ‗so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted 
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it‘ (Re MB [1997], para. 30). Furthermore, competent patients 
have been permitted to refuse even life-saving treatment ‗for any reason, rational or 
                                                                                                                                                        
While capacity and competence are sometimes distinguished – say, by presenting capacity as a 
psychological term that comes in degrees and competence as a binary legal standard – we will treat them as 
synonymous for the purpose of this paper.  
2
 We clarify further what is meant by normative neutrality in the next section. Suffice to note already that 
referring to policies or theories as normatively neutral is not necessarily to say that they are value-free. If there 
are values and norms that can be endorsed from within different (reasonable) worldviews, then appeal to them is 
compatible with neutrality.  
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irrational, or for no reason at all‘ (para. 16), which implies that being motivated by 
inconsistent, deplorable or otherwise mistaken value-judgements does not itself preclude 
competence. Similarly, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states: ‗A person is not to be treated as 
unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision‘ (§1.4). 
We doubt that satisfactory accounts of mental capacity can be given while 
maintaining normative neutrality. In this article, our primary focus is  philosophical rather 
than legal conceptions of personal autonomy – for which mental capacity is a necessary and 
sometimes also sufficient condition. Specifically, we criticise accounts that deny that 
autonomy could require evaluative skills or competencies other than those the person being 
assessed either does or would reasonably accept. Our arguments seek to show that 
normatively neutral conceptions of autonomy do not (and likely cannot) contain a principled 
account of mental capacity without smuggling in substantive normative commitments.  
Mental disorder is a litmus test which we believe reveals the suppressed normative 
commitments – the hidden substance – that purportedly neutral accounts of autonomy must 
rely upon. It is a suitable test for a number of reasons: it is widely agreed (including by 
proponents of neutral accounts) that mental disorder can imperil mental capacity and thereby 
individual autonomy; mental disorder also raises issues of liberty, insofar as treatment 
sometimes involves coercive intervention; and, partly due to longer life expectancy, it is 
increasingly widespread. 
Our aims are mainly negative: to highlight significant shortcomings in purportedly 
normatively neutral accounts of mental capacity, shown by their inability to identify the 
capacity-subverting, and so autonomy-undermining, effects of some mental disorders. 
However, we conclude by suggesting how non-neutral accounts of capacity might exorcise 
the spectre of unwaranted paternalism, or at least keep it at bay. 
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Section 1: Normatively neutral conceptions of autonomy 
In assessing normatively neutral accounts of autonomy, clarity regarding the kind of 
neutrality they invoke is crucial. Unfortunately, standardly employed vocabulary and 
distinctions are problematic; thus, we criticise them, before suggesting a better way to capture 
the disagreement. 
In a legal context, commentators often draw a distinction between outcome-based 
tests and functional or procedural tests of mental capacity.
3
 According to the former, persons 
cannot competently decide to pursue certain outcomes (such as to commit suicide); whereas 
on the latter, there are no such restrictions, but only a requirement that persons employ 
certain abilities or deliberative processes in decision-making, or have the capability to do so. 
Similarly, within philosophical and other scholarly debates, theorists often distinguish 
between content-neutral and substantive accounts. The latter place direct constraints on the 
content of competent choices, such that only some things can be competently chosen; and the 
former places no such constraints, or only indirect ones – for example, that a person accepts 
in a minimally rational way their own desires and motives, whatever they are, or would do so 
if attending to them and their genesis (Christman 1991:22). 
While these distinctions are clear enough, they do not adequately locate 
disagreements about normative neutrality. Crucially, certain conceptions of autonomy contain 
no direct constraints on the content of choices which can count as competent and also no 
outcome-based criteria, but their indirect constraints on competent decision-making cannot be 
adequately understood in a normatively neutral way (Benson 2005:133-5). Instead, these 
indirect constraints are value-laden – such as requiring autonomous agents to value 
themselves (see Benson 1994, 2005) – or they rely upon epistemic norms – say, about the 
degree of warrant required of beliefs that inform the deliberative process (see Wolf 1990).  
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 See, for example, Law Commission 1991, esp. para. 2.43-4; see also Owen et al. 2009, esp. section 2. 
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Similarly, drawing the distinction as one between value-neutral and value-laden 
accounts is imprecise. Firstly, the neutrality in question is not just about values – sometimes 
the issue is wider and about norms more generally (including epistemic norms governing 
belief, as just mentioned). Given the nature and degree of pluralism about such norms, 
proponents of neutral accounts should want to be neutral regarding them too, and not just in 
relation to any values at stake. Secondly, people – including many without capacity – 
frequently invoke values in their decision-making, and capacity assessments cannot simply be 
blind to these values. Indeed, being value-neutral in the sense of discounting every value, 
including those of the person assessed, could be highly inappropriate and disrespectful. 
Instead, we must carefully delineate which values and norms are at issue: those of the person 
in question, the assessor(s), their community, or objective values (if there are any). The 
assessed person‘s values remain significant even when assessors should be neutral in the 
sense of not interposing their own commitments or those of the community. 
We take neutral accounts to be normatively internalist – the only values and norms 
they subsume within the conditions of autonomy are those of the assessed individual. 
Internalists exclude other evaluative requirements from assessments of autonomy, such as 
conformity with social norms or objective values.
4
 For example, inability or systematic 
failure of a person‘s decision-making to reflect their own ethical or epistemic commitments 
could inhibit autonomy on internalist grounds, but only insofar as these commitments are 
genuinely the person‘s own. For advocates of normative neutrality, going further and 
introducing external evaluative criteria, ‗[…] would make the property of autonomy 
divergent from the idea of self-government that provides its intuitive base‘ (Christman 
1991:14; his emphasis). 
                                                 
4
 This is not to say that autonomy is all that matters. Someone can be autonomous, but his or her action can still 
justifiably restricted if his or her actions harm others in a way that is not compatible with respect for their 
autonomy and rights (see, for example, Christman 2009 175f n. 26). Our focus is self-harming behaviour, so we 
shall leave this complication aside. 
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In contrast, we call ‗substantive accounts‘ those that incorporate externalist norms 
into the conditions of autonomy. These can directly constrain the outcome or content of 
choices, or instead constrain reasoning or deliberative processes on the basis of competency 
requirements that make reference to substantial norms and values. Substantive accounts are 
externalist because the norms which feature as conditions of autonomy do not have to be 
endorsed by the person whose autonomy is assessed. For instance, substantivists could claim 
that decision-making competence, and thereby autonomy, requires a person to value 
themselves in their deliberations, irrespective of that person‘s current or former values. 
Similarly, whether or not people have a commitment to truth, substantive accounts might 
make autonomy conditional upon acting on true beliefs, or having the capacity to know, and 
live by, the truth. 
Substantive requirements can seem to conflict with an oft-cited fact about modern, liberal-
democratic societies: reasonable pluralism about the good, or indeed about other values and 
norms (including the nature and importance of truth in our lives).
5
 Aversion to substantive 
and thereby externalist conditions is particularly acute in cases of mental disorder, given what 
is at stake (such as the potential for long and extensive restrictions of liberty) and the history 
of abuses in psychiatry. Instead, normatively neutral accounts of autonomy merely impose 
minimal competency conditions – such as the absence of manifest inconsistency – alongside 
authenticity conditions – such as coherence of decisions with the person‘s overall values and 
beliefs (see Christman 2011; 2009:ch.7). These conditions, it is proposed, should be 
                                                 
5
 There is a further complication here: by accepting pluralism only when it is reasonable, one moves already 
away from a purely value internalist picture, for unreasonable persons might not accept that their views are 
unreasonable and as such subject to interference. It is notoriously difficult to say what ‗reasonable‘ means and 
where its limit should be set, but we take it that for the purposes of liberal political philosophy ‗reasonableness‘ 
consists in accepting that state coercive power should only be used in a way that is compatible with what 
persons willing to be convinced by arguments can agree on after free discussion. The reasonableness restriction 
is not always part of accounts of autonomy, such that it remains correct to say that proponents of such accounts 
aim for normatively neutrality. Still, once such accounts are part of a wider liberal theory, they (tend to) become 
subject to the reasonableness criterion and the overall theory would only be partially, albeit possibly maximally, 
neutral as regards to values and norms. 
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acceptable to each competent person as legitimate constraints. While most adult human 
beings would count as competent on these conditions – indeed, this is an explicit desideratum 
of liberal views (see Appelbaum 1998:377) – normatively neutral accounts of autonomy are 
also meant to identify those genuinely unable to decide for themselves. In the next section, 
we argue that these accounts are unable to perform this task, particularly when facing 
individuals with mental disorder. 
 
Section 2: mental disorder as a challenge 
Mental disorders can interfere with decision-making capacity and (thereby) autonomy. Of 
course, not all mental disorders significantly impair capacity and autonomy, nor does 
everyone with a potentially autonomy-undermining disorder experience the same obstacles to 
decision-making. 
Advocates of substantive and normatively neutral accounts alike agree on the threats 
posed by certain disorders, such as impairment of ‗cognitive function‘ in understanding and 
recalling information resulting from conditions like vascular dementia. However, when 
mental disorders are more directly entangled with a person‘s evaluative stances, then 
substantive and neutral approaches suggest divergent accounts of autonomy‘s relation to 
mental disorder. For example, major depression can interfere with decision-making capacity, 
although not because of any lack of understanding of relevant information, but rather due to 
stifling negativity or impassive indifference towards future possibilities. Similarly, other 
mood and anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, anorexia nervosa, personality disorders, and 
phobias, can all involve implicit normative stances which are not merely unwise, but also 
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seemingly impede individuals‘ capacities to make their own decisions.6 Defenders of 
normative neutrality aim to avoid making a person‘s autonomy conditional upon adherence to 
values or norms which they do not accept, and thus face a challenge: can they account for the 
capacity-subverting influences of those mental disorders which affect evaluative orientation 
and judgement without lapsing into a form of substantivism? 
We shall consider, and ultimately reject, the two main argumentative strategies open 
to defenders of neutrality: first, that blanket exclusions for persons affected by mental 
disorders could be incorporated into the conditions of capacity and autonomy; or, second, that 
normatively neutral accounts already contain functional or procedural tests which identify 
capacity-subverting (and so autonomy-undermining) aspects of mental disorder. There is 
evidence of each strategy within the existing literature, but bringing them to the fore requires 
reconstructive interpretation, partly because mental disorder is still too often treated as black 
box – acknowledged as a defeater of autonomy, without any detailed exploration of how, 
when, and why this is. We focus upon John Christman‘s influential work, which, rather than 
being to his discredit, reflects his pioneering attempts to develop a fleshed-out version of 
normative internalism about autonomy. 
 
2a: blanket exclusion 
The blanket exclusion strategy stipulates that mental disorder and autonomy are 
incompatible: persons with a mental disorder are incompetent and therefore lack autonomy. 
When articulated so starkly, it remains unclear whether this view finds much support – 
especially as discussion of mental disorder is so often cursory amongst advocates of 
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 We consider specific cases below – relying mainly on an appeal to intuition to suggest that autonomy is 
compromised in these cases. 
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normative neutrality. Yet, passages which do discuss mental disorder are often beset by a 
significant ambiguity, which can invite a blanket exclusion reading: 
[I] Delusion, paranoia, and other psychopathologies will be inconsistent with autonomy 
because of the suffering agent‘s inability to make consistent and reflective judgements 
about her own set of desires by which she is moved to action. (Christman 1991:17) 
[II] [A]utonomy has been conceived as potentially embodying a variety of conditions [… 
some of which] relate to cognitive and normative competence – rationality, self-control, 
absence of psychosis and other pathologies, and so on. (Christman 2009:134; see also 135, 
147) 
[III] The case of a psychotic patient or a senile patient or an infant are also cases where 
consent is impossible but here it is not a temporary problem. (Dworkin 1988:117) 
On a natural interpretation these statements are claims to the effect that competence is simply 
inconsistent with ‗delusion, paranoia, and other psychopathologies‘, ‗psychosis and other 
pathologies‘, or being a ‗psychotic patient or a senile patient‘.7  
If mental disorders (or some subset thereof) preclude decision-making competence, 
then there may be no need to introduce externalist norms to identify threats to autonomy 
posed by disorders that affect evaluative orientation or judgement. Yet, for conceptions of 
autonomy that exclude mental disorder to remain normatively neutral, the disorders at issue 
must be specifiable in a normatively internalist fashion. In other words, internalism about 
autonomy cannot rest on externalism about mental disorder without thereby compromising its 
neutrality. However, there are good reasons for thinking that an internalist conception of 
mental disorder is not available. 
The concept of disorder is normative insofar as its use involves both description and 
evaluation. To be disordered is not merely to be unusual or a statistical outlier, since it 
implies failure or incapability relative to norms of good-functioning, such as health or 
                                                 
7
 However, each statement could be linked to a functional test – the most obvious possibility being a reading of 
‗because‘ as ‗if and only if‘ in statement I – and we shall address such interpretations shortly (section 2b). 
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wellbeing. Thus, employing the concept of mental disorder involves taking a stand on what is 
valuable, namely how the human mind (and/or brain) ought or ought not to function.
8
 
Ordinarily, this judgement is not relative to the normative commitments of the person 
diagnosed; therefore, it presupposes a normatively externalist perspective, which threatens 
neutrality. This is most explicit in the influential US American diagnostic manual for mental 
disorder – DSM-IV – according to which diagnoses of mental disorder are only appropriate if 
there is ‗clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning‘, assessment of which involves consultation of sources ‗in 
addition to the individual‘ (1994:7; see also ICD-10, p. 5). Indexing disorder to occupational 
and social functioning effectively ties it to historically specific cultural, social, and economic 
practices, which are deeply saturated by norms and values that the individual might not share. 
Commonly-used diagnostic criteria for specific mental disorders also seem to rely 
upon a normatively externalist perspective, irrespective of whether the very concept of 
mental disorder does. Consider the ICD-10 criteria for anankastic personality disorder, which 
include ‗feelings of excessive doubt and caution‘, ‗undue preoccupation with productivity to 
the exclusion of pleasure and interpersonal relationships‘, and ‗unreasonable reluctance to 
allow others to do things‘ (F60.5, 1991:205f; emphasis added).9 Judging what is excessive, 
undue or unreasonable presupposes evaluative standards, yet it is characteristic of ‗ego-
syntonic‘ conditions, such as anankastic personality disorder, that persons diagnosed do not 
consider their feelings or behaviour to be awry (see DSM-IV 1994:630). Thus, the diagnostic 
criteria presumably refer to what the majority of psychiatric professionals, or people in 
general, would take to be excessive, undue or unreasonable (or perhaps to an objective 
                                                 
8
 The normative nature of mental disorder and diagnostic criteria is contested – we come to this shortly. 
9
 DSM-IV contains a similar characterisation in terms of ‗excessive orderliness‘ and ‗inflexibility about matters 
of morality, ethics, or values‘ (1994:629, 669, 670). We return to the issue of inflexibility about matters of 
morality, ethics, or values below with the example of Martin Luther (see section 2b). 
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standard for such normative judgements).
10
 Moreover, this is not an isolated example: both 
ICD-10 and DSM-IV littered with normatively charged criteria of an externalist kind – other 
than ‗undue‘, ‗unreasonable‘, and ‗excessive‘, diagnostic criteria are expressed in terms like 
‗inappropriate‘ (especially, but not exclusively, compared to ‗age-appropriateness‘), 
‗irrational‘, ‗culturally impossible‘, ‗eccentric‘, ‗unrealistic‘, ‗peculiar‘, ‗bizarre‘, ‗odd‘, 
‗unusual‘, ‗insensitivity to prevailing social norms/conventions‘, ‗inconsistent with 
subcultural norms‘, ‗over-concern/preoccupation‘, ‗overvalued idea‘, ‗maladaptive [to the 
social, cultural, and economic environment]‘, and ‗expectable‘, as well as extra-statistical 
notions of ‗normal‘ and ‗abnormal‘. Thus, unless other diagnostic criteria for mental disorder 
are available, accounts of autonomy which rely upon a blanket exclusion of mental disorder 
will not be normatively neutral. 
The normative basis of psychiatric diagnosis is a highly contentious topic, and  some 
argue that these normative elements can and should be reduced and eventually expelled 
altogether (for discussion see Bolton 2008; Fulford et al. 2005; Sadler 2004; Sadler (ed.) 
2002; Wakefield 1992). Therefore, it may be overhasty to criticise attempts at blanket 
exclusion on these grounds. Nevertheless, the contentious nature of the stand implicitly taken 
on diagnostic criteria has not even been recognised by those who appear to favour blanket 
exclusion of mental disorder. Furthermore, such neutral accounts of autonomy stand and fall 
with the success or failure of normatively neutral conceptions of disorder and diagnostic 
criteria, and it would be fair to say that the current state of the debate tends more strongly 
against such conceptions (see Bolton 2008). 
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 There is a tension in the manuals between using cultural and social norms to identify mental disorder and not 
classifying social critics or dissidents or merely highly eccentric but sane individuals as mentally ill. Both 
manuals contain clauses to the effect that those who are deviant from or in conflict with society, but where this 
deviance or conflict is not a symptom of dysfunction, should not be classified as mentally disordered (DSM-IV, 
1994:xxif; ICD-10, 1991:5) – presumably partly as a response to the use of psychiatry in suppressing dissidents 
in the Soviet Union. However, given the fact that being a dissident will often involve social and occupational 
dysfunction and could be described as ‗maladaptive‘ to the social environment, it is difficult to see how this 
exclusion as specified provides sufficient safeguards. Whilst this tension may be ineliminable, transparency and 
contestability would be better ways of handling this issue than purported neutrality (see section 3).  
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Even if these difficulties surrounding the normative substance of psychiatry and 
medicine can be resolved, the blanket exclusion of mental disorder requires a non-ad hoc 
justification. Yet, beyond a simple correlation between disorder and heteronomy, no such 
rationale is forthcoming.
11
 Furthermore, blanket exclusions seem fated to be inapplicable in 
practice, since many (if not most) assessments of mental capacity require making fine 
discriminations within the population of those already diagnosed with mental disorder. 
Merely identifying an incompatibility between psychopathology and autonomy provides little 
help in determining which disorders, decisions and circumstances can authorise paternalistic 
intervention – especially as current legal regimes, such as the Mental Capacity Act in 
England and Wales, are decision-specific, not status-based, such that a person with a mental 
disorder might be legally competent to make some decisions (for example, what to wear or 
eat on a given day) but not others (such as decisions about whether to take their anti-
psychotic medication or where to reside). 
Finally, defining competence so as to exclude those found to be mentally disordered 
threatens to be discriminatory. If it is true that people with mental disorder can still make 
some competent decisions for themselves, then not granting them autonomy rights because of 
their mental disorder (a status) would discriminate against them compared to the rest of the 
population who would have these rights denied only on the basis of a decision-specific 
assessment and incompetence finding. Indeed, the recent UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities calls for de-linking of all legislation that can authorise deprivation 
of liberty (which would include capacity-based legislation, such as the Mental Capacity Act 
in England and Wales), from references to disabilities, be they physical or mental:
12
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 Alternatively, this could support functional readings, which, through employing specific competence tests, do 
suggest principled grounds for why certain disorders can impair the evaluative dimension of decision-making 
(see section 2b). 
12
 Thinking of this in terms of ‗de-linking‘ is suggested in the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights‘s 2009 
thematic study on enhancing awareness and understanding of the Convention on the Rights with Persons with 
13 
 
States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others in all aspects of life.  
[…] 
the existence of disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty. (Art. 12(2) and 
Art. 14(1b)) 
Mental capacity assessment that proceeded solely on the basis of establishing whether or not 
the person has a mental disorder, and which subsequently led to deprivations of liberty solely 
on the basis of a finding of mental disorder, would thus contravene the Convention and, at 
any rate, seems discriminatory.
13
 
 
2b: functional tests 
The second strategy employed by proponents of normatively neutral conceptions of 
autonomy is to offer functional tests that are meant to identify autonomy-subverting 
influences without incurring a commitment to specific values, substantive notions of 
rationality, and the like. This chimes well with legal provisions of liberal-democratic 
societies, in which functional tests of competence or capacity are often operative. For 
example, in England and Wales, the decision-specific test of the Mental Capacity Act 
ultimately premises mental capacity on the ability to understand relevant information, to 
retain it long enough to make a decision, to use or weigh it, and to communicate the decision 
formed, while recognising that possessing these abilities need not imply that one avoids 
making unwise decisions (or what others would judge to be such). Similarly, in many US 
jurisdictions, competence rests on the capacity to understand the relevant information, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Disabilities, para. 48-9 (see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/10session/A.HRC.10.48.pdf, 
last accessed 27/06/2011). We thank Phil Fennel for making us aware of this source. Other interpretations of the 
Convention are more radical and take it to oppose even functionalist models of legal capacity (see Dhanda 
2007). 
13
 There is one further worry about the blanket exclusion strategy: given the prevalence of mental disorder, it 
runs the risk of going against the liberal desideratum of counting most adults among the competent.  
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appreciate how it applies to one‘s own case, reason on the basis of it, and then express a 
choice, but there is no (direct) constraint on the content of decisions or values that can be 
competently adopted. It is an interesting question whether the legal tests are indeed 
normatively neutral both in spirit and practice (see Owen et al. 2009, especially section 2; 
Richardson 2010), but we will concentrate here – at least in the first instance – on the 
philosophical models.  
Specifically, we will consider the following four functional tests (here formulated as 
questions, such that negative answers to them indicate lack of capacity and autonomy):  
A. Is the decision minimally rational in the sense that it does not proceed from a 
manifestly inconsistent set of desires or beliefs? 
B. Does the decision – or the preferences and values on which it is based – express the 
person‘s enduring identity? 
C. Is the decision based on preferences and values from which the agent would not be 
alienated, if she were to reflect on their genesis? 
D. Is the decision made without compulsion, such that the person could choose and act 
otherwise?  
These present the most promising attempts to formulate neutral tests of autonomy, but – as 
we shall argue – they are, nonetheless, inadequate.14 
 
A. As mentioned earlier, normatively neutral accounts typically contain competency 
conditions, including a requirement of minimal rationality of the decision-making process, 
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 Frankfurt‘s structural conception of autonomy is not discussed here, but would also fail to account for the 
cases we consider below. Specifically, persons with autonomy-undermining, but ego-syntonic mental disorders 
can be said to identify with their lower order volitions at higher orders – they are like Frankfurt‘s willing addicts 
(see 1971), but nonetheless (can) lack autonomy.  
The Mental Capacity Act‘s test (understanding, retaining, using or weighing decision-relevant 
information and expression a choice) is also not discussed, partly because the proposed four tests considered 
here could be understood as offering philosophical explorations of its crucial, but little understood, ‗use or 
weigh‘ dimension (even though they were not expressively meant as such by the authors in question). 
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whether in relation to an actual process of reasoning, or hypothetically, such that this 
reasoning could have been successfully undertaken (see Christman 1991:11, 16f, 22; 
1993:282f; 1995:35; 2009:134, 154f; see also Arneson 1994:47, 61). In Christman‘s 
influential account, this is spelled out as the requirement that the (actual or hypothetical) 
reasoning process does not involve ‗manifestly inconsistent desires or beliefs‘ (1991:15, 
Christman‘s emphasis; see also 13fn22, 16, 17; 1993:287, 288; 2005:278; 2009:155; see also 
Berofski 1995:10): 
Those preferences or beliefs that are in obvious conflict, ones which the agent could bring 
easily to consciousness and recognize as incompatible, are what one would label 
―manifestly inconsistent‖. (Christman 1991:15; see also 1993:287) 
If agents have manifestly inconsistent desires or beliefs, they cannot be said to be self-
governing, for they are then mere playthings of conflicting forces.
15
 Also, failing to meet 
even such a minimal rational requirement suggests that the person is unable to engage in the 
critical reasoning required by normatively neutral accounts of autonomy (see Arneson 
1994:46f). Still, this rationality requirement is relatively lax, since few of us have fully 
consistent desires and beliefs, and it is one of the key intuitions of liberal accounts of 
autonomy that most adults should be found to possess the capacity in question (and thus the 
moral status that underpins liberal rights and protections against the state and others; see 
Appelbaum 1998:377; Feinberg 1989:28). 
 However, it is not convincing to take absence of manifest inconsistencies as sufficient to 
exclude the autonomy-subverting influence of mental disorder. While it might be true of 
some psychopathologies associated with deficits of autonomy that those suffering from them 
                                                 
15
 Is requiring an absence of minimal inconsistency an internalist norm (that is, one that applies whether or not 
each person to whom this norm is applied accepts it)? Sometimes, it sounds as if it is meant to be a 
(quasi)transcendental condition of competent agency (hence the formulation used in the main text), and if so, it 
would be internalist by default. 
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are subject to manifest inconsistencies, this is by no means true of all of them. Consider two 
cases: 
Anorexic Lucy: Lucy has been diagnosed with anorexia nervosa for several years, and her 
body weight is now critical. Unless she gains weight very soon, there is a significant risk 
that she will suffer organ failure and death. Although sometimes finding it hard to 
concentrate and think, she is usually lucid and can pass various cognitive tests. Whilst not 
actively wishing to die, Lucy repeatedly states that she still feels too fat, takes herself to be 
sufficiently well to doubt that her condition is as critical as the doctors say, and, besides, is 
more averse to gaining weight than dying. For Lucy, the commitment to thinness and 
bodily control overshadows all other values and relationships, and has become integral to 
her sense of self.
16
 
 
Deluded Roger: Roger has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. He has a particular 
delusion, thinking himself to be God. The doctors claim that he suffers from diabetes, but 
he refuses to take any medicine for it, even after being warned that it will endanger his 
health, well-being, and eventually his life. While he accepts that people who suffer from 
diabetes should take medication, he reasons that as an immortal, all-knowing and all-
powerful God, he could not be affected by, never mind die from, a physical disease and, at 
any rate, would know if the material body in which he appears to us were ill, and could 
cure it by an act of will.
17
 
It would seem that both of these individuals lack the decision-making capacity necessary for 
autonomy, but neither of them is subject to manifest inconsistencies. If anything, they are 
models of consistency – with a fully worked-out hierarchical value system (Lucy) and belief 
system (Roger). The reason why we would still say that they lack capacity and autonomy (at 
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 While this case is fictional, its components build on the experiences and views reported by persons with 
anorexia nervosa and their mothers in Tan et al. 2006. One of these persons – Participant I – states: ‗I wasn‘t 
really bothered about dying, as long as I died thin‘ (Ibid., 274; see also 275); and insists that anorexia nervosa is 
part of her identity (Ibid., 276). 
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 This example derives from real life cases, knowledge about which we owe to a Wellcome Trust funded study 
by Gareth Owen on decision-making in three groups of patients (those with severe depression, schizophrenia, or 
frontal lobe damage). We thank him for access to this material.  
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least in respect to the respective decision in question) is better cashed out in terms of 
substantive conceptions of autonomy: both Lucy‘s decision to refuse food – due to her 
valuation of thinness and control above all else – and Roger‘s to refuse diabetes medication – 
because of a delusional belief that he is God – are expressing, for example, an inability ‗to 
cognitively and normatively understand and appreciate the world for what it is‘ (Wolf 
1989:150).
18
 
Substantive accounts, while capturing (better) why competence or capacity is missing, 
eschew normative neutrality in virtue of their ethical and metaethical commitments (see also 
Wolf 1990). Despite conflicting with legal rhetoric, such accounts actually fit well with legal 
practice. Thus, the authors of the MacArthur Competence Assessment Test for Treatment 
(MacCAT-T), an assessment tool distilled from US common law, when commenting on cases 
of patients with anorexia nervosa like Lucy, write that their ability to appreciate is impaired 
here because ‗the degree to which they valued being thin (or detested being fat) involved a 
considerable distortion of reality‘, not least in thinking that ‗nothing in the world – friends, 
family, life itself – is of any value except thinness‘ (Grisso and Appelbaum 2006:296; see 
also Grisso and Appelbaum 1998:45). Insofar as this involves a clear value judgement 
(specifically, that thinness is not the only or paramount value) and their views really express 
the common law tradition in the USA, then legal practice there is in fact value-laden in an 
externalist way. Similarly, recent UK legal cases show that judges are prepared to rule that 
persons lack capacity if they do not appreciate the seriousness of their condition and if their 
decision is based on a misperception or misconception of reality (see, for example, Re T 
[2004]; Trust A and Trust B v. H [2006]). This suggests that respect for decisions based on 
                                                 
18
 Wolf speaks of freedom, not autonomy – rejecting the latter because she equates it with metaphysical self-
creation, the possibility of which she denies. Since ascription of autonomy is not commonly seen to include the 
metaphysical thesis Wolf rejects and the conditions she proposes can be conceptualised well in terms of self-
determination (not just freedom), it is standard practice to speak of Wolf‘s view as one about autonomy, and we 
follow this practice here.  
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‗irrational reasons‘ is in legal practice much more circumscribed and evidences a more 
substantive approach than the legal rhetoric suggests.
19
 The more substantial approach is even 
clearer when we look beyond mental capacity to legislation on involuntary hospitalisation 
because of risks to oneself (and/or others), such as the Mental Health Act 1983, amended 
2007, in England and Wales. 
Be that as it may, it is important to distinguish the consistency of desires, values and 
beliefs, as well as consistent reasoning on the basis of them, on the one hand, from their truth, 
justification, or coherence with well-supported ethical outlooks and scientific conceptions of 
the world, on the other (see also Bayne and Levy 2005:80). The former are achieved by many 
of those with mental disorders – indeed, it has been suggested that those with certain mental 
disorders reason more logically than other people (see Owen, Cutting and David 2007). 
Whatever is problematic about having delusional beliefs, it is naïve to think that possessing 
them means that one would necessarily fail the minimal inconsistency test. Arguably, 
consistency is a prerequisite of a minimum psychic order necessary for possessing the 
capacity for autonomy (see Arneson 1994:55; Oshana 1998:94), but both Lucy and Roger, 
and many others whose capacity and autonomy are in doubt, meet this criterion. 
 
B. Other elements of purportedly normatively neutral functional tests are also 
problematic. Thus, it is sometimes proposed that it is a condition of competence and thereby 
autonomy that the preferences and values that guide someone‘s life be part of his or her 
enduring identity (Christman 2009:149; Craigie 2011; see already Christman 1991:15). 
However, such a test is unsuited to handle autonomy-subverting influences. As we saw 
earlier, Anorexic Lucy has fully integrated her condition and value orientation into her 
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did not stop the judges from finding the person before the court to lack capacity. With few exceptions, this is 
common pattern. 
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identity to the extent that if someone could remove it by – say – waiving a magic wand, she 
would deny that the person emerging from this would be herself.
20
 Again, many mental 
disorders that undermine autonomy involve conflicted identities and/or self-alienation (such 
as obsessive compulsive disorder or borderline personality disorder), and this might suggest 
that people with these disorders lack an enduring identity and, in virtue of this, they lack 
autonomy. Yet, not all disorders do involve such conflicted identities or self-alienation – 
indeed, recall that not even all personality disorders do, since persons with ego-syntonic 
conditions, such as anankastic or anti-social personality disorders, typically have non-
conflicted identities and stable beliefs and desires. We would still want to say that autonomy 
is undermined by many such conditions, including those of Anorexic Lucy and Deluded 
Roger. 
 
C. Even Christman‘s otherwise laudable move to include the history of the belief- and 
preference-formation into the conception of autonomy does not suffice to exclude autonomy-
subverting factors. He proposes that autonomy requires that were the individual to become 
aware of the history of their belief and motivation set, then they would not be alienated from 
this set. Again, this is meant as a relatively minimal condition: neither actual reflection is 
required (merely non-alienation if the agent were to critically reflect), nor is the standard of 
transparency required for such reflection set at a demandingly high level (Christman 
1991:11f; 2009:154). While this has the advantage of not excluding the bulk of the 
population, it creates false positives for many people suffering from mental disorder. Thus, 
Anorexic Lucy might discover, say, by way of psychotherapy, that her drive to be thin at all 
costs is a reaction to overbearing parenting. She might also learn from feminist theories and 
sociology more generally that a fixation on thinness is often fostered by social expectations of 
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women, including contentious cultural norms regarding demeanour, femininity and 
perfectionism, which are expressive of a deeply patriarchal society. Nevertheless, Lucy might 
respond with indifference or even gratitude in discovering this, rather than revising her 
commitments. Perhaps she views the overbearingness of her parents as a reason to continue 
to assert her will in the one area where it is very difficult to wrestle control from her (her 
body), and decides to appropriate and subvert, rather than reject, the gender identity thrust 
upon women by society. Similarly, someone might recognise that certain self-harming 
behaviours (cutting or refusal of food) are the result of an abusive childhood, but view this as 
her only real way of coping, and accept it along with the possible consequences of death or 
severely reduced quality of life.
21
 If proponents of normative neutrality want to accept that 
persons can autonomously endorse unusual, even bizarre preferences – as Christman does 
(1991:21n32, 23) – then they lack the resources to account for the lack of capacity (and 
thereby autonomy) in these examples. 
 
D. Finally, advocates of neutral accounts could also appeal to the compulsive nature of 
decisions made by those with certain mental disorders. For example, in the Code of Practice 
to the Mental Capacity Act (§4.22), it is said that a person with anorexia nervosa may lack 
capacity in relation to some decision because ‗their compulsion not to eat might be too strong 
for them to ignore‘, rendering them unable to use or weigh relevant information (even if it is 
understood). This approach to anorexia is traceable to an earlier judgement in the Court of 
Appeal (Re W [1992] 4 All ER 627 at 637 and 639), in which Lord Donaldson argues:  
[…] it is a feature of anorexia nervosa that it is capable of destroying the ability to make an 
informed choice. It creates a compulsion to refuse treatment or only to accept treatment 
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Croydon Health Authority [1995] Fam. 133 (Court of Appeal).  
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which is likely to be ineffective. This attitude is part and parcel of the disease and the more 
advanced the illness, the more compelling it may become. 
No direct objection is raised to the values of the anorexic person – instead, mental capacity is 
meant to be impaired by their inability to utilise information in decision-making.
22
 Thus, 
more generally, if compulsiveness is an effect of those mental disorders that appear to 
undermine evaluative capacities, then sufficient psychological pressure, such that someone 
cannot think, decide or act otherwise, might explain failures of self-determination without the 
need to invoke normatively externalist criteria. 
However, autonomy is not always impeded by compulsion, even in circumstances in 
which an individual cannot do otherwise. Consider the apocryphal words that Martin Luther 
is said to have spoken when defending his writings at the Diet of Worms: ‗Here I stand; I can 
do no other‘ (see Dennett 1984:133 and Wilson 2007:153, 169-70). If Luther genuinely 
lacked the psychological capability to renounce his works – or his acting against conscience 
would have been spiritually or rationally intolerable – then were his actions thereby less 
autonomous? Quite the reverse – it would seem that weaker convictions, which are not too 
strong to ignore, are less likely to be expressions of what a person takes to be fundamentally 
valuable or important, and therefore can provide a correspondingly less exemplary basis for 
self-determined action. Similarly, someone identifying as gay, or a dissident accused of 
‗delusions of reformism‘, is likely to feel compelled to refuse purported treatments, where, so 
to speak, ‗this attitude is part and parcel [of their condition]‘ and ‗the more advanced [it is], 
the more compelling it may become‘, yet this casts no doubt on their mental capacity.23 In the 
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 The legal exclusion of compulsiveness is mirrored by philosophical demands for value-flexibility. For 
example, Dworkin requires there be ‗[…] some ability both to alter one‘s preferences and to make them 
effective in one‘s actions‘ (1988:17). 
23
 In line with our argument, Christman denies that autonomy requires an ability to change our fundamental 
commitments, or even that we can reflect separately from them (2009: 121-32). He only accepts a more 
qualified requirement, namely, the ability to stand back from these commitments only when and because we are 
deeply alienated from them. However, neither Luther nor Anorexic Lucy is deeply alienated from their 
respective commitments. 
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absence of non-neutral normative criteria which would identify pathological kinds of 
compulsion, then compulsiveness alone is not sufficient to impair autonomy. Consequently, 
Anorexic Lucy and her decision to refuse force-feeding cannot be counted as incompetent by 
advocates of normative neutrality on these grounds, even if there is a sense in which her 
condition compels her decision. 
 
None of the proposed functional tests adequately capture the capacity-subverting, autonomy-
undermining aspects of mental disorder. Each test has been shown to fail in isolation and 
when applied jointly (as case of Anorexic Lucy that ran through the discussion of all of them 
demonstrates). We should, however, discuss a possible response by a defender of normative 
neutrality. Our argument depends upon the identification of various false positives: persons 
lacking autonomy who cannot be identified as so lacking by normatively neutral accounts. 
However, advocates of normative neutrality might bite the bullet here – acknowledging that 
counting persons such as Lucy or Roger as autonomous is counterintuitive, but accepting this 
as a revisionary consequence of their view. 
In response, we can ask why should self-harming, ill-informed or irrational decisions 
be respected? Mill might be thought to provide an anti-paternalist justification.
24
 He writes: 
[…] the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. (Mill 
[1859]/1991:14). 
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considerations in support of their view (see, for example, Szasz 1970:116). 
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The reasons he offers are that individuals are best-placed to judge their own interests, that the 
moral equality of persons demands respect for others‘ liberty, and that paternalism would 
inhibit character-development. 
However, Mill makes an important qualification: 
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human 
beings in the maturity of their faculties. [...] Those who are still in a state to require being 
taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against 
external injury. (Mill [1859]/1991:14).  
Thus, appealing to Mill‘s harm principle raises the further question of under what 
circumstances someone is ‗in the maturity of their faculties‘ – precisely what is at issue 
regarding Lucy and Roger. Mill‘s examples of immaturity are developmental: young people 
before reaching adulthood and, with an odious ethnocentrism, ‗barbarians‘ from ‗backward 
states of society‘ who are not yet ‗capable of being improved by free and equal discussion‘ 
(Mill [1859]/1991:14). However, the salient traits of maturity, including a capability to know 
one‘s own interests, can also presumably be lost, such as through dementia and (as we hope 
to have made plausible) through temporary or permanent failures of evaluative abilities 
wreaked by mental disorder. In light of this justification for restricting liberty, Mill may not 
prove to be an unalloyed ally of normative neutrality.
25
 
Even were a more radical line taken, disregarding Mill‘s qualifications, a problem 
remains: it is not neutral to champion a form of liberty whose only bounds are harm to others. 
Some dignitarians, for example, claim that human dignity can take precedence over 
individual liberty – an argument that, for example, France‘s Conseil d’Etat endorsed 
considering ‗dwarf tossing‘ (27 Octobre 1995, N° 136727, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge), 
                                                 
25
 Also, Mill is, in fact, willing to place direct constraints on what counts as autonomous choices: entering into 
any irrevocable contract and especially selling or giving oneself into slavery cannot be done autonomously (and 
does not entitle the person a right against paternalistic interference), for ‗[t]he principle of freedom cannot 
require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom‘ (Mill, 
[1859]/1991:114). 
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subsequently upheld by the United Nations Human Rights Council in Wackenheim v. France. 
Other dignitarians argue that respect for self-determination cannot entail the right to make 
decisions which conflict with dignity (such as some decisions to commit suicide), since 
human dignity is the very basis of this respect (Velleman 1999). Notably, whether or not 
there is a conflict with dignity is not up to the individual alone on this view, but is decided by 
public, intersubjective reasoning. We do not mean to endorse the dignitarian view, but merely 
use it to make a general point: even if actions, decisions, or people falling under the scope of 
the harm principle can be individuated in a normatively neutral fashion, whether the principle 
is justified remains deeply contested in a fashion precluding neutrality. 
 
Section 3: replacing neutrality with transparency and accountability 
We have shown that attempts to develop normatively neutral approaches to autonomy are 
unsuccessful: either they produce false positives (thereby failing as criteria of autonomy) or 
they rely upon hidden and contentious substantial commitments (thereby forsaking 
neutrality). It now looks as if we face an impasse, since the alternative — substantivism — 
has been thought to be unduly paternalistic, even authoritarian, and to open the door to abuses 
of power. Nonetheless, ours is not a counsel of despair. Instead, we suggest practical steps to 
rehabilitate substantivism. 
Substantivism can seem most unattractive in its strongest forms, which place direct 
constraints on what people may autonomously decide or the reasons for their decisions. 
However, substantivism can also take a different form – indirect or, as it is also known, weak 
substantivism – and adopting this kind might begin to allay the concerns. For instance, Paul 
Benson advocates a normative-competence account, on which autonomy ‗demand[s] that 
agents‘ capabilities of perception, reasoning and motivation be connected in the right sorts of 
25 
 
way to what is really valuable or reasonable for them‘ (2005:134). Since what is really 
valuable or reasonable for people need not be relative to what they take to be valuable or 
reasonable, then this account is substantive. However, formulating conditions for autonomy 
in terms of agents‘ capabilities (rather than the content, motivation, or propriety of individual 
decisions) makes room for people to autonomously make individual unwise decisions, so 
long as there is not a systematic distortion in their evaluative skills.
26
 
Our core examples of schizophrenic delusion and anorexia nervosa are plausibly cases 
of such systematic distortion, where we can identify recurrent failures of perception, 
reasoning or motivation which prevent people deciding with their genuine interests properly 
in view. Thus, indirect substantivism would not fall prey to the same false positives as 
normatively neutral accounts of autonomy, yet promises to be less prescriptive than direct 
substantivism. In emphasising abilities and skills, there is also a focus on functions instead of 
status, thereby minimising the discrimination that status-based approaches to capacity are 
often thought to imply. The challenges facing indirect substantivism remain considerable, and 
we do not suggest dangers like tyranny of the majority, unjustified paternalism, and abuse of 
power, can be completely put to bed; but we also believe that the situation is not hopeless. In 
particular, we think substantivism can be buttressed by increased transparency, the 
democratic contestability of conditions for capacity and autonomy, and a historically 
sensitive caution concerning restrictions of liberty. 
When an account of autonomy is meant to inform a conception of mental capacity, 
and therefore people‘s liberty is at stake, then transparency concerning its conditions is 
essential. Imposing potentially contentious externalist conditions – presupposing beliefs and 
values that others may not share – makes this clarity especially important. Arguably, even 
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 Wolf‘s position (invoked above in section 2b) might also be understood as indirectly substantive because it 
simply requires ‗[…] the ability to cognitively and normatively understand and appreciate the world for what it 
is‘ (1989:150; Wolf‘s emphasis). 
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some existing legislation and guidance falls short in this respect – for instance, disagreement 
persists about the legitimacy of invoking external norms when applying the Mental Capacity 
Act test that someone be able to ‗use or weigh‘ information relevant to the decision to be 
made (§3(1)(c); see also Tan et al. 2009). The main danger of such opacity is arbitrariness 
and undue discretionary authority in mental capacity assessment, which places assessors in 
positions of dominance, threatening the assessed individual‘s freedom, even if assessors 
exercise their powers responsibly.
27
 
Despite seeming benign, greater transparency concerning the norms underlying 
capacity assessment might be resisted on the grounds that these standards can be handled 
implicitly (as in much physical diagnosis) and that demanding too much explicitness risks 
limiting the flexibility available to assessors to implement pragmatic solutions on a case-by-
case basis.
28
 The concern is that difficult-to-codify assessment skills that come with 
experience become marginalised in favour of clear but crude explicit principles, leading to 
both false positive and negative ascriptions of mental capacity.  
We take these concerns seriously and would like to see training that develops skills 
which good assessors can exercise confidently (with appropriate institutional oversight) 
rather than requiring continual recourse to strict principles that increase inter-rater reliability 
only at the price of the validity of assessments (see also Fulford et al. 2005:80f). However, 
increased transparency does not preclude this. When the values and beliefs guiding 
assessment are explicitly thematised, this allows greater scrutiny, opening them to revision in 
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arbitrary use of power (Fennell 1996). 
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exercising their own values – particularly when it comes to refusal of treatment (see Richardson 2010). 
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light of reasoned criticism.
29
 We acknowledge that greater transparency need not necessarily 
lead to increased or better consensus. Sometimes, it can produce more strife and entrench 
opposition. Our plea for transparency is not based on the judgement that there are no risks 
attached to it, but merely that there are greater risks in not taking this path – namely, that 
substantive and supposedly normatively neutral approaches alike smuggle in contentious 
evaluative commitments without discussion. 
Secondly, alongside transparency about their presence, substantive evaluative 
conditions of mental capacity should be subject to democratic accountability and 
contestability. Transparency opens up the terrain of value; then, what evaluative capabilities 
are relevant can be settled by political discussion and argument (see also Bolton 2008: 224, 
238f). In order to forestall majoritarianism, such that values and beliefs are not imposed on 
others with little or no recourse to the voices of those affected by such democratic decisions, 
then this may need to be an asymmetric kind of debate – more weight being given to the 
views of those who have or have had mental disorders, as well as those involved in 
supporting and caring for them, such as psychiatrists and social workers. In addition, the 
dangers of holding others to merely parochial standards could be ameliorated by attempts to 
achieve an ‗open impartiality‘ (Sen 2009: ch.6) that assimilates a maximally heterogeneous 
set of cultural perspectives and identities. In practice, this also signals the importance of a 
diverse workforce of those charged with making mental capacity assessments, so that the 
values and beliefs of some groups (e.g. white middle-class men) do not predominate 
uncontested. 
We think – not without controversy – that capacity assessment, based on norms not 
shared by the assessed person, and leading to restriction of liberty, is sometimes necessary; 
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but the harms of these interventions can be lessened by being shaped by those who have 
experienced being subject to them (and subjecting others to them). For instance, this might 
involve a process of institutional oversight – involving those with mental disorders, people 
close to them, care workers, psychiatrists, and so on – guided by such factors as the views of 
former patients concerning whether and when they would have wanted another decision-
maker to take control of decisions around treatment or financial affairs, and the like. Again, 
this process should follow the principle that those affected by requirements for evaluative 
competencies should always have a collective voice in deciding how these conditions are 
introduced and interpreted, even if in specific cases an individual‘s wishes cannot always be 
fully respected. 
Finally, let us comment further on worries about abuses of power by care workers and 
mental health professionals. In psychiatry, substantive diagnostic conditions have a 
particularly dark history – recall the examples of hospitalisation for homosexuality and 
‗delusions of reformism‘ mentioned above. However, not all substantive conditions should be 
rejected on this basis. Instead, this provides a reason to implement what we call a ‗negative 
capacity regime‘. Such a regime would be founded upon a ‗concrete negation of historical 
wrongs‘ (Niesen 2004:83) and be oriented by the need to avoid repetition of past abuses. In 
this respect, historically informed caution concerning the harms of abuse (rather than respect 
for autonomy per se) speaks in favour of a very high threshold for non-consensual 
intervention even when mental capacity is found to be lacking.  
Once more, this is not a silver bullet – difficult questions remain: what should the 
exact lessons be from past abuses? How and when is a treatment sufficiently similar to the 
past abuses, despite other differences, to trigger heightened concern and safeguards? How can 
we avoid overcompensating for past abuses by letting too many false positives slip through 
29 
 
our anti-interventionist net? What we do say is that practices are likely to be better for 
keeping the past in view, not that there no dangers down this path. 
By way of conclusion, let us sketch briefly what our approach to mental capacity 
would mean in practice.
30
 We already mentioned diversification of the workforce. Alongside 
this, training of psychiatrists and other capacity assessors would have to change to emphasise 
the value- and norm-laden nature of disorder, diagnostic criteria, and the capacity assessment 
process (some of the required training material is already being developed under the heading 
of ‗value-based practice‘; see Fulford et al. 2005:80f, 83). Strategies for navigating the 
challenges involved in fostering normative competencies, whilst allowing unwise decisions 
when these competencies are in place, should also feature in training. Changes in psychiatric 
practice might also be necessitated – notably, to encourage more engagement with the content 
of people‘s beliefs and values as well as how they experience them – and in the way capacity 
assessment and best-interest decisions are recorded and made. Democratic mechanisms 
would have to establish and regularly review what normative competencies should be 
considered as requisites of autonomy and the legal rights that come with it. At least the broad 
outlines of what should count as (potentially autonomy-undermining) mental disorder may 
have to be decided by democratic mechanisms of a society as a whole, not just by specialist 
bodies. Organisations of people with the conditions said to undermine these competencies, 
and those close to or caring for them, would need to have a major role in these democratic 
mechanisms, allowing ample opportunity for contestation. Also, those who have experienced 
life with these conditions might have to be included as lay members onto case review panels 
– just as already mental health tribunals often include lay members. Ombudsmen and 
advocate services should also become more frequent. Judges and other key decision-makers 
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would have to regularly engage the public in such a way as to make the decisions in question 
maximally transparent to lay persons. Finally, every effort should be made to avoid 
interference with liberty – often creative thinking about treatment or care provisions can help 
here instead of accepting a narrow set of alternatives (such as treatment against refusal or no 
treatment at all) – and, where non-consensual intervention is unavoidable, there have to be 
robust safeguards. 
None of this will provide cast-iron guarantees against unwarranted paternalism, and 
significant obstacles to indirect substantivism remain. Yet, we believe that its prospects are 
brighter than purported normative neutrality, which – if the arguments in this paper are sound 
– is either toothless or hides its substantive elements, rather than submitting them to public 
scrutiny.
31
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